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ABSTRACT 
Since the conclusion of the Cold War and subsequent downsizing, the U.S. Army 
has struggled with the challenge of recruiting and retaining the highest quality soldiers to 
ensure future readiness. Each year, the Army plans and executes over 100,000 permanent 
change of station assignments for its 345,000 enlisted soldiers. The inherently complex 
challenge of assignment planning consists of balancing Army requirements and readiness 
with soldiers' professional needs and personal preferences. The Army's centralized and 
hierarchical assignment process may be improved using proven information technologies. 
Perhaps the process could be made more efficient using web-based markets and 
intelligent agents to more effectively plan and assign soldiers to billets. This thesis 
evaluates the strengths and weaknesses of the Army's assignment process and its 
outcomes, compares and contrasts it with the Navy's assignment process, estimates and 
evaluates the utility of one- and two-sided matching processes using a computer 
simulation, and makes recommendations, where appropriate. 
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I.       INTRODUCTION 
A. OVERVIEW 
This thesis investigates and analyzes the U.S. Army's enlisted assignment process. 
It describes the assignment process, key stakeholders involved and their concerns, and the 
policies that guide the process. It examines advantages and disadvantages of the current 
assignment process and identifies possible opportunities for improving it in the future. 
B. BACKGROUND AND REASONS FOR STUDY 
Since the conclusion of the Cold War and subsequent downsizing, the U.S. Army 
has struggled with the challenge of recruiting and retaining the highest quality soldiers to 
ensure future readiness. Defined by the Army Soldier Quality Program, a high quality 
recruit is a high school diploma graduate whose Armed Forces Qualification Test 
(AFQT) score percentile is in the top half of the national population. (AR 600-3) In order 
to make the Army an employer of choice for the current generation of young adults, it is 
necessary to understand the myriad of factors that affect their decision to serve in the 
military. 
Factors external to the Army include political and economic conditions, family 
influences  and general  attitudes toward military  service.     Increasing numbers of 
American youth are unfamiliar with the military and the value of military service 
because, compared to previous generations, fewer families have role models who have 
served in uniform.  "The unprecedented and possibly unending prosperity in the civilian 
sector combined with a commonly accepted notion of an ill-defined post-Cold War 
military role, a decreased propensity to enlist and lower societal esteem afforded to 
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military service have the potential to change the Army forever. Increasingly, the Army 
will find it more difficult to attract, recruit and retain high-quality individuals to fill its 
ranks." (Chambers) In fact, the Army missed its recruiting goals in 1998 and 1999, and 
made its goal in 2000 with the help of increased commitment of resources, including 
more recruiters and higher enlistment bonuses. Challenges in recruiting increase the 
importance of implementing policies to retain sufficient quantities of high quality soldiers 
to meet the readiness goals of the Army. 
Internal to the Army, factors include operations tempo and quality of life issues 
that affect individual soldiers and their families. Two years after the Gulf War, shortly 
after the Army and other U.S. services achieved peak operational readiness, the draw 
down began in earnest. Since September 1992, enlisted operating strength in the U.S. 
Army has declined by more than 25%, while its operating tempo has increased by 
approximately 400%. (Active Army Enlisted Master File) Further, the Defense 
Manpower Data Center (DMDC) reported in the 1999 Survey of Active Duty Personnel, 
that Army soldiers spent more time deployed from their permanent duty station (81.1%) 
than the other branches of the U.S. military. The strain caused by this high level of 
operating tempo manifests itself in sagging morale and ultimately, in poor retention. 
Soldiers' quality of life is affected by the frequency and duration of deployments, 
resources available for training, quality of leadership, perceived opportunities for 
personal and professional development, pay and benefits, and assignment opportunities. 
Among those who responded to the 1999 Survey of Active Duty Personnel, more than 
85% reported that on-base quality of life services, programs, and facilities are generally 
available, which contributes positively to the overall satisfaction of service members and 
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their families. Additionally, under the leadership of President Bush, the current 
administration and Congress generally support improved compensation (pay and 
benefits) for the nation's military. While these issues play an important role in a soldier's 
overall satisfaction with the Army, executing an efficient and effective assignment 
process remains essential. 
Each year, the Army plans and executes over 100,000 permanent change of 
station assignments for its 345,000 enlisted soldiers. (Piskator) The inherently complex 
challenge of assignment planning consists of balancing Army requirements and readiness 
with soldiers' professional development needs and personal preferences. The Army's 
centralized and hierarchical assignment process could be improved using proven 
information technologies. Specifically, the process could be made more efficient using 
web-based markets and intelligent agents to more effectively plan and assign soldiers to 
billets. This thesis evaluates the strengths and weaknesses of the Army's assignment 
process and its outcomes, compares and contrasts it with the Navy's assignment process, 
estimates and evaluates the utility of one- and two-sided matching processes using a 
computer simulation, and makes recommendations, where appropriate. 
C.       RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Research Question 
What is the overall efficiency and effectiveness of the Army's current assignment 
process? 
2. Subsidiary Research Questions 
Who are the stakeholders in the assignment process, and what are their concerns? 
What positive aspects of the Army's assignment process should be preserved? 
What pathologies, or deviations from an efficient process exist, and what are their 
effects on retention? 
What comparisons can be made between the Army and Navy assignment 
processes? 
What potential benefits, if any, can be gained by using intelligent agent 
technology in the Army and Navy assignment processes? 
D. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
The scope of the thesis will include a thorough assessment of the Army's 
assignment process, related policies and procedures, and the potential benefits of 
implementing intelligent agent technology in the process. This study will be limited to 
the process for assigning active duty enlisted soldiers. Every effort will be made to 
collect objective data, however, quantitative data obtained through interviews and 
questionnaires will be inherently subjective. 
E. ASSUMPTIONS 
1. This thesis assumes that the reader has a general understanding of military 
assignment processes. Analysis and Findings are found in Chapter V, and are part of a 
larger study of U.S. military assignment processes. Additionally, Appendix A provides a 
list of acronyms used in this thesis. 
2. It is also assumed that data obtained from the Defense Manpower Data Center 
survey (DMDC), and responses obtained in questionnaires and personal interviews with 
various stakeholders accurately reflect the attitudes and opinions of typical Army 
soldiers. 
F. ORGANIZATION 
The methodology used in this thesis research will consist of the following steps: 
Conduct a literature review of books, magazine articles, the Internet, and other 
library information resources. Conduct a thorough review of Army policies and 
procedures as delimited in manuals and regulations relating to the Army's enlisted 
assignment process. Compare and contrast the Army's assignment process with the 
Navy's detailing process. Employ a computer simulation to estimate and evaluate the 
utility of one-and two-sided matching processes using a computer simulation. Identify 
and examine implications of employing intelligent agent technology in future assignment 
processes. 
G. BENEFITS 
This study identifies the pathologies of the U.S. Army's assignment process. It is 
part of a larger study, being conducted by Professors Bill Gates and Mark Nissen at the 
Naval Postgraduate School, to examine using proven technologies to improve the 
assignment processes in the U.S. military services. Desirable potential outcomes include 
a more efficient and effective assignment process yielding improved job matches for 
soldiers and commands leading to increased job satisfaction, that results in better job 
performance and higher retention. 
H.       CHAPTER SUMMARY 
As the premier ground force of the U.S. military, the Army must attract and retain 
the highest quality American youth. Young Americans today enjoy unprecedented career 
and educational opportunities, and in order to compete with employers in the private 
sector, other branches of the military, and other government agencies, the Army must 
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become an employer of choice. It must meet prospective and current soldiers' 
expectations for personal preferences, professional development, compensation and 
quality of life for themselves and their families. Meeting this challenge includes 
executing an assignment process that is efficient and effective in satisfying the interests 
of all involved. 
II.      OVERVIEW OF ENLISTED ASSIGNMENT PROCESS 
A.       ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 
The objective of Army manpower management, described in Army Regulation 
570-4, Manpower Management, is to properly man Army forces in support of national 
security missions. Introduction of new doctrine, advanced technology, modern 
equipment, and force design must result in a credible land power deterrent and fighting 
force for the future, while assuring the greatest manpower productivity possible. 
Manpower management focuses on accurately identifying the human resource 
requirements (in terms of both quantity and quality) necessary to perform specific tasks 
and upon the organization and position structure in which they will be most efficiently 
and economically used. This includes justifying these requirements in the Total Army 
Analysis (TAA), the Army's Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System 
(PPBES), and allocating available resources against validated requirements. Manpower 
management functions relate closely to other resource management actions. Specific 
manpower functions include requirements determination, documentation, allocation, 
utilization, and analysis and evaluation. 
Manpower requirements are based on the most effective and efficient organization 
and, therefore, represent the minimum essential numbers of civilian and military 
positions needed to accomplish valid mission responsibilities for both TDA and MTOE 
organizations.1     Army manpower requirements  are  determined within established 
1
 Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) organizations normally serve institutional support 
functions. They include the Army's training base and other vital supporting organizations. Modified Table 
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manpower constraints in order to accomplish national strategic goals, in coordination 
with the Department of Defense (DoD) Planning, Programming and Budgeting System 
(PPBS). 
Authorization documents provide organizational structures supported by Army 
resources against which units will be organized in the current, budget and first program 
years. They provide a record of approved organization structure, mission, and 
capabilities, personnel requirements and authorizations, and equipment requirements and 
authorizations. 
The Program and Budget Guidance (PBG) distributes Army military and civilian 
manpower authorized spaces to Major Army Commands (MACOMs) and operating 
agencies for reallocation to subordinate echelons. 
Manpower requirements are composed of military and civilian personnel as well 
as contractor support required to execute the mission of the organization. How these 
different types of personnel may be used in the best interests of national defense forms 
the basis for utilization policies. 
The continual analysis and evaluation of missions, priorities, guidance, 
constraints, and available resources form the basis of manpower assessments and 
validation. (AR 570-4) 
of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) organizations perform the warfighting missions of the Army. 
MTOE organizations include deployable combat forces. 
1. Army Personnel Proponent System 
The Army Personnel Proponent System is designed to accomplish Army 
manpower management objectives, and is organized into eight personnel life-cycle 
management functions. These functions are structure, acquisition, individual training and 
education, distribution, deployment, sustainment, professional development and 
separation. (AR 600-3) This thesis is concerned with the distribution function for 
enlisted personnel. 
2. Military Personnel System 
Within the Army Personnel Proponent System, soldiers are distributed using the 
two-dimensional Military Personnel (MILPER) System. The peacetime mission of the 
MILPER System provides services to commanders, soldiers, family members and 
retirees. During wartime, the MILPER System serves four purposes. 
1. Directs the personnel portion of the Army's wartime command and control 
system. 
2. Collects, processes, and manages combat-essential MILPER information and 
executes commanders' decisions. 
3. Delivers replacements, mail and other vital wartime services to commanders 
and soldiers on the battlefield. 
4. Ensures the Tactical MILPER units execute the MILPER system and at the 
same time, prepare for rapid deployment in support of their wartime mission. 
An overarching concept called the managerial framework is used to direct, 
manage and operate the MILPER system.   The managerial framework subdivides the 
MILPER system into a diverse set of manageable segments called functions.  There are 
twenty-seven MILPER functions including awards and decorations, band operations, 
enlisted  promotions  and  reductions,  leaves  and passes,  recruiting  and retention, 
reassignment and others.   Nineteen of the MILPER functions are normally executed 
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during combat. Reassignment is a peacetime function that in war is performed as a part 
of replacement operations.   The remainder of this chapter will describe the peacetime 
reassignment processes for enlisted personnel. 
B.       ARMY REASSIGNMENT PROCESS FROM A MICRO PERSPECTIVE 
This section provides a detailed view of how the Army determines the positions 
that need to be filled, and who will fill them. It is adapted from Army Regulation 600-8- 
11, which describes the Reassignment function of the Military Personnel System. 
1.        Enlisted Personnel Assignment System 
The Enlisted Personnel Assignment System seeks to place the right soldier in the 
right job at the right time. The primary goal of the system is to satisfy the personnel 
requirements of the Army. Secondary goals are to equalize desirable and undesirable 
assignments by assigning the most eligible soldier from among those of like Military 
Occupational Specialty (MOS) and grade; equalize hardships of military service; assign 
each soldier so he or she will have the greatest opportunities for professional 
development and promotion advancement; and meet the soldier's personal desires. (AR 
614-200) The primary goal of serving the needs of the Army and the secondary goals of 
serving soldiers' interests often conflict, and they require assignment managers to 
perform a difficult and delicate balancing act using the Enlisted Personnel Assignment 
System. 
2.        Enlisted Distribution Target Model 
Described in Army Regulation 614-200, Enlisted Assignments and Utilization 
Management, the Enlisted Distribution Target Model (EDTM) is an automated system 
that creates enlisted distribution targets by Military Occupational Specialty (MOS), grade 
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and Unit Identification Code (UIC). The model fills each UIC reflected in the Personnel 
Manning Authorization Document (PMAD) with projected available inventory from the 
MOS Level System (MOSLS) according to DCSPER Distribution Policy. 
The EDTM constrains the assignment process to coincide with the projected 
operating strength targets. It represents the assets the Army realistically expects to be 
available for distribution. The'model targets each UIC for fill according to the priority 
given to the unit. Therefore, the possibility exists (depending on the fill priority and 
projected inventory) for a unit to be targeted at less than authorized strength. 
The allocation of requisitions for each of the requisitioning activities will be 
limited to the command's share of available inventory, determined by the EDTM. 
Requisitions are allocated to the field using the Enlisted Distribution Assignment System. 
3.        Enlisted Distribution Assignment System 
The Enlisted Distribution Assignment System (EDAS) is the primary tool that 
assignment managers use to achieve the Army's goal of placing the right soldier in the 
right job at the right time. EDAS is a complex automated system that enables assignment 
managers to manage each step of the enlisted personnel assignment system. Beginning 
with the requisition, EDAS matches available soldiers with available positions, nominates 
the best qualified, enables assignment managers to verify nominated soldiers, and issues 
assignment instructions to verified soldiers. 
Figure 2.1 summarizes the Enlisted Personnel Assignment System, beginning 
with the approved requisition from the field. Steps in the process are described in greater 
detail in the paragraphs that follow. 
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Figure 2.1. Flow Diagram of the Enlisted Personnel Assignment. 
From: AR 600-8-11 
a.   Generating Requisitions 
Normally, the assignment process is initiated monthly when the Total 
Army Personnel Command (PERSCOM) develops requisition allocations consistent with 
Department of Defense (DoD) and Army manpower policies, guidance and authorization 
documents.   PERSCOM forwards requisition allocations, based on MOS and grade, to 
the requisition authorities.  Requisition authorities include Headquarters, Department of 
the Army (HQDA) agencies and activities, and Major Army Commands (MACOMs). 
The Military Personnel Division (MPD) or Personnel Service Company (PSC) of each 
requisition authority then compares authorized and projected positions with current 
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assigned strength and known or projected gains and losses to confirm PERSCOM's 
allocations. The MPD or PSC then expands the MOS and grade allocation to a detailed 
requisition, with special instructions if required, and forwards these expanded requisitions 
back to PERSCOM. PERSCOM reviews, edits and passes valid requisitions to EDAS. 
(1) Availability of Soldiers for Reassignment.    Soldiers 
become available to be applied against requisitions for various reasons. Solders who 
enlist in the Army are available for assignments after completing training and receiving 
an MOS. Soldiers who meet minimum Time In Service (TIS) requirements are also 
available for reassignment when they have: volunteered for reassignment; completed an 
oversea tour of duty; completed schooling or training; completed stabilization; or 
completed normal time on station in the Continental United States (CONUS). 
b.  Matching Soldiers to Requisitions 
EDAS is used to assign all enlisted soldiers except those completing Basic 
Training (BT) or Advanced Individual Training (AIT). EDAS is an automated 
nomination and assignment procedure that compares qualitative requirements recorded 
on requisitions against selected qualification factors for each soldier. Some of the major 
qualifications considered include grade, MOS and skill level, Skill Qualification 
Identifier (SQI), Expiration Term of Service (ETS), months since last PCS and/or months 
since return from overseas (to ensure stabilization), soldier's availability month compared 
with requirement month, and, finally, the soldier's area of preference. 
Each soldier is compared to each requisition and given a numeric score for 
every requisition for which he or she can be nominated.   Comparing the requisition's 
qualitative requirements and the soldier's qualifications derives scores.    Once every 
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soldier's record has been reviewed and points have been awarded for a qualitative match 
to each requisition, a group of nominations is selected that provides the best overall 
requisition match in terms of quantity and quality. 
Assignment preferences of the soldier are considered, but the needs of the 
Army are given primary consideration. Soldiers are assigned to their preference only if 
the needs of the Army can also be served. 
c. Assignment Nomination 
The nomination procedure in EDAS has three basic goals. First, each 
valid requisition will have at least one soldier nominated to it, provided sufficient soldiers 
are available for assignment. Second, requisitions will be filled by relative priority. 
When a shortage of soldiers exists, the shortage will be shared proportionately by all 
requisitioning activities according to priority. Finally, soldiers will be nominated to an 
assignment for which they are qualified. 
d. Assignment Verification 
Assignment managers at PERSCOM verify nominations produced by 
EDAS, and after reviewing all available information, either accept a soldier for the 
assignment or reject all nominees and return the requisition to the selection process for 
new nominations. Qualified individuals may also be selected manually to match the 
requisition regardless of a nomination by EDAS. 
Each week, PERSCOM transmits Assignment Instructions (AI) for each 
approved nomination to both losing and gaining commands. (To allow for proper review 
by losing commands, the transmission of assignment instructions to gaining commands is 
delayed until 5 months before the soldier's arrival month.)   The next step is a pivotal 
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point in the assignment process: the losing command verifies the assignment. Because of 
delays in reporting and errors in the databases, selected individuals may not qualify for 
the assignment.   If the soldier does not qualify or cannot qualify in time to meet the 
requirement, a deletion or deferment request must be submitted.   If the individual is 
qualified and the assignment is consistent with announced Department of the Army (DA) 
policy, the local MPD or PSC of the losing command accepts the assignment. Issuing the 
necessary orders for travel finishes the assignment process. (AR 600-8-11) 
C.       NEED FOR AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH 
1.  Effective versus Efficient 
Chapter IV, Methodology, of this thesis defines effectiveness and efficiency as 
they apply to the assignment process. In short, effectiveness refers to how the process is 
conducted, whether it is cost-effective, and whether it is appropriately labor-intensive. 
Efficiency refers to how well the system provides a quality match between available 
soldiers and available positions. Ideally, the system will be conducted in a cost-effective 
manner that is not excessively labor-intensive and results in good matches between 
soldiers and positions so that both the soldier and gaining command are satisfied. 
The Army's assignment process, using EDAS, is relatively effective. EDAS 
leverages certain benefits of technology to automate much of the process including 
matching soldiers to requisitions, nominating qualified soldiers to requisitions, and 
transmitting assignment instructions. And, the process provides appropriate screens by 
assignment managers at PERSCOM and personnel specialists at the MPD or PSC of 
losing commands to verify the qualification and eligibility of soldiers nominated and 
assigned to fill vacant positions. 
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However, as it is currently conducted, EDAS uses a one-sided matching process 
to nominate soldiers to requisitions. The process places a high premium on the needs of 
the Army and considers the soldier's preferences only as an afterthought. While the 
process may be effective in meeting the Army's needs, it risks alienating soldiers 
unnecessarily and giving them reason to leave the Army. Previously, when the nation's 
economy marched along at more modest growth rates and offered fewer employment and 
education options, soldiers were more willing to accept undesirable assignments. Even if 
they didn't like their assignment, soldiers commonly accepted them as nothing more than 
an unpleasant and unavoidable consequence of military service. 
Today, however, soldiers perceive their opportunities quite differently.   They 
believe the burgeoning economy promises them a wide selection of jobs from which to 
choose, many requiring shorter hours than in the military, less personal sacrifice, less 
hazardous conditions, and better pay and benefits. As a result, soldiers are less willing to 
accept undesirable jobs, and without adequate incentives they leave the military. Rather 
than reenlisting, they seek employment where they believe they will have more control 
over their working environment.   Compared to 1992, military recruiting has been more 
difficult, and unprogrammed attrition in the Army has increased. If the Army improved 
the influence of soldier preferences in the assignment process to better match soldiers to 
available positions using a two-sided matching process, perhaps the Army, and the other 
services, could compete more favorably with the private sector as an employer of choice 
for current and future generations of young Americans. 
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D.       CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The Army's manpower management and personnel proponent systems are 
necessarily complex to properly man Army forces in support of national security strategy. 
The Army personnel proponent system consists of eight personnel life-cycle management 
functions, including distribution, which is the focus of this thesis. Distribution is 
accomplished using the two-dimensional MILPER system. In peacetime, EDAS is used 
to perform the reassignment function to place the right soldier in the right place at the 
right time. EDAS uses a one-sided matching process to meet the Army's needs and 
places only secondary emphasis on soldier preferences. Using a two-sided matching 
process may allow the Army to better satisfy soldier preferences and compete more 
favorably as an employer of choice, while continuing to satisfy the Army's manning 
requirements and balance readiness with soldier's satisfaction with military service. 
17 
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III.    STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS 
A.       OVERVIEW 
Ultimately, the success of any organization, and its processes, depends on its 
ability to satisfy its stakeholders. "A stakeholder is defined as any person, group, or 
organization that can place a claim on an organization's attention, resources, or output or 
is affected by that output." (Bryson) This section identifies and examines the 
stakeholders of the Army enlisted assignment process, and their perspectives, to help 
identify areas where greater efficiencies might be gained in the process. 
Similar to financial markets, the assignment process has stakeholders who oversee 
the process, buyers and sellers who participate in it, and a market maker who manages it. 
Government and military leaders and policy makers, and their organizations, are 
responsible for ensuring the process supports Army readiness goals. Army agencies and 
commands that require soldiers to perform their mission are the buyers, or consumers, 
and the soldiers who provide the necessary manpower are the sellers, or suppliers. The 
U.S. Total Army Personnel Command (PERSCOM) is the market maker who brings 
together the buyers (e.g. commands) and sellers (e.g. soldiers) to find the best possible 
match for each assignment. Indirectly, the President and Congress, and the American 
public who depend on having a capable and ready military to achieve the national 
military strategy, could be considered stakeholders. This analysis, however, will focus 
only on key stakeholders who are directly involved with the assignment process and are 
affected by its outcomes. 
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B.        STAKEHOLDER MAP 
Stakeholder analysis begins by identifying each key stakeholder and examining 
their interest in the process. The organizations, groups and individuals that have a direct 
interest, or stake, in the enlisted assignment process and its outcomes include: 
- Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs 
(ASA (M&RA)) 
- Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER) 
- Commanding General, U.S. Total Army Personnel Command (PERSCOM) 
- Assignment Managers 
- Local Military Personnel Divisions (MPD)/Personnel Service Battalions (PSB) 
- Commanders of Major Army Commands (MACOMs) 
- Field Commanders (e.g. Divisions, Brigades, Battalions, etc.) 
- Soldiers 
Figure 3.1. Assignment Process Stakeholder Map. 
20 
The above stakeholder map depicts the key stakeholders in the enlisted 
assignment process. They are positioned to show their relationship to the process, and 
not each other. This helps to focus the analysis on how each stakeholder affects, or is 
affected by the process, and not on the bureaucracy of reporting relationships and other 
hierarchical organizational structures. 
C.       STAKES 
Each of the key stakeholders has a direct relationship to the enlisted assignment 
process, and their stakes are discussed below. There are numerous individuals and 
organizations that provide vital services in support of the assignment process and its key 
stakeholders, but they are not considered in this analysis because their relationship to the 
process is indirect. 
1. Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs 
The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs (ASA 
(M&RA)) oversees assignment policy on behalf of the Secretary of the Army. The 
Assistant Secretary is responsible for ensuring that assignment policies effectively 
promote readiness goals and requirements in support of the national defense. 
2. Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER) 
The DCSPER2 serves as the senior Army policy official for the MILPER system 
and provides Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) supervision of all 
personnel policy formulation, programs, goals, architecture, standards, structures and 
2
 The Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (DCSOPS) exercises final authority over the 
resourcing of the MILPER System to include allocating units, manpower authorizations, and funding. For 
this stakeholder analysis, the influence of the DCSOPS on the daily operations of the assignment process is 
represented by the DCSPER. 
21 
resources.  The DCSPER serves as the senior Army policy official for the reassignment 
processing of all soldiers. 
Returning to the analogy of a financial market, the Assistant Secretary and 
DCSPER provide oversight to ensure that the Army's manpower market functions 
correctly. They influence the process by developing Army-level policies that are 
enforced by PERSCOM. 
3. Commanding General, U.S. Total Army Personnel Command 
(PERSCOM) 
PERSCOM has functional responsibility for reassigning all soldiers and issuing 
Assignment Instructions (AI). PERSCOM manages the daily operations of the MILPER 
system to effectively and efficiently assign soldiers to billets.3   PERSCOM interprets and 
implements policies initiated by the DCSPER and manages the distribution of soldiers to 
support the Army's mission worldwide. 
4. Assignment Managers 
The rubber meets the road at the assignment manager level. Assignment 
managers at PERSCOM personally implement soldier assignment policies to fill valid 
requisitions in EDAS with qualified soldiers. They review the list of soldiers nominated 
by EDAS for each available position, and either accept a soldier for the assignment or 
reject all nominees and return the requisition to the selection for new nominations. 
Assignment managers are primarily concerned with meeting the Army's needs by filling 
3
 The U.S. Army Soldier Support Center (USASSC) is a joint owner in managing the Army's MILPER 
System. Primarily, USASSC formulates doctnne, combat developments, unit organizational structure and 
training. USASSC is not directly involved in the daily operation of the assignment process, and is therefore 
not presented as a key stakeholder. As a joint owner of the MILPER System, the USASSC is represented 
by PERSCOM in this analysis. 
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each requisition, and give  only  secondary consideration to meeting the soldier's 
preferences. 
5. Local Military Personnel Divisions (MPD)/Personnel Service 
Battalions (PSB) 
Local  Military  Personnel  Divisions  and Personnel  Service Battalions  (or 
Companies) provide services to soldiers for field commanders.4 At the battalion level, 
Personnel Action Centers (PACs) provide soldiers an interface with the personnel support 
and assignment processes.   Soldiers are also able to perform certain functions online, 
independent of their unit PAC.  Ongoing initiatives seek to maximize using the Internet 
to provide PAC support.   These initiatives offer a tremendous opportunity to allow 
soldiers  greater influence  over their personal  affairs,  including their assignment 
preferences.   All of the personnel service centers mentioned above benefit from an 
assignment system which offers soldiers the best possible support. 
With the support of the local personnel service centers, PERSCOM and the 
assignment managers serve as the market makers in the Army assignment process. They 
execute the processes that match soldiers with available billets to meet the needs of the 
Army and individual soldiers and they are keenly interested in having available a system 
to perform their responsibilities as efficiently and effectively as possible. 
6. Commanders of Major Army Commands (MACOMs) 
MACOMs are the first consumers of assignment process output, or assigned 
soldiers. MACOMs are also responsible for helping to ensure compliance with 
assignment policies, including submitting enlisted personnel requisitions to PERSCOM 
4
 Military Personnel Divisions (MPD) and Personnel Service Battalions (PSB) are also generically 
called Military Personnel Offices (MILPO). 
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and ensuring soldiers within their commands are properly assigned and utilized. Their 
interest in the process output is two-fold: first, they desire to have sufficient quantities of 
soldiers to accomplish their assigned missions; second, they desire to have sufficiently 
high quality soldiers who are skilled and motivated to perform their duties well. Subject 
to the constraint of how many soldiers are available for distribution Army-wide, getting 
sufficient quantities presents less of a challenge to the MACOMs than getting satisfactory 
quality. 
7.        Field Commanders 
Field  commanders  include   commanders   of divisions,  brigades,   battalions, 
companies and equivalent units that employ soldiers on a daily basis in garrison and 
operational environments.  They are direct consumers of the assignment process.  They 
observe first-hand the benefits of having enough soldiers to accomplish their mission. 
Ideally, they would like to have 100% of the soldiers they are authorized. In reality, they 
normally have somewhat less than that.   They also observe first-hand the benefits of 
having  high  quality   soldiers  who   are  motivated to   demonstrate  high  levels  of 
performance.     Field  commanders  also  must  endure  the  consequences  when  the 
assignment system fails to place the right soldier in the right job at the right time. Field 
commanders would benefit from an assignment process that meets both of their 
expectations simultaneously, and having enough high quality soldiers to successfully 
perform their assigned missions. 
8.        Soldiers 
Soldiers are also direct consumers of the assignment process, and are affected 
most by its outcomes.   Soldiers who excel in their duties usually are those who are 
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satisfied with their assignment and associated factors, including their duties, assignment 
location, leadership and quality of life issues affecting them and their families. Most of 
these factors are represented in their assignment preferences. It is possible to consider 
them in the assignment process, and it is probable that doing so would increase soldiers' 
satisfaction and, therefore, their performance. 
E.       CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Soldiers and commands are the key stakeholders in the Army assignment process, 
and are the primary consumers of its output and outcome. The desired output is having 
the right soldier in the right job at the right time. The desired outcome is achieving the 
highest possible readiness of the involved commands and the Army. Ideally, the process 
will satisfy all of the stakeholders, but it is especially important to satisfy soldiers and 
commands. If soldiers and commands are both satisfied by the output of the assignment 
process, they will likely perform better and achieve higher readiness levels. And, if 
soldiers' and commands' satisfaction and performance are enhanced, other key 
stakeholders will also benefit. The objective of this analysis is to assess how well the 
Army assignment process satisfies the interests of its stakeholders, particularly soldiers 
and commands, and to determine whether using a two-sided matching process would be 
beneficial. 
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IV.    METHODOLOGY 
A.       OVERVIEW 
This section describes the methodology employed in preparing this thesis. 
Professor Bill Gates first proposed the topic of this thesis, as a part of his research with 
Professor Mark Nissen, to explore the possibilities of using web-based technologies to 
improve the Navy's detailing process for enlisted sailors. In the larger study, examining 
the Army, Air Force and Marine assignment processes is intended to provide useful 
insight to help identify how the Navy might benefit from lessons learned from its sister 
services. Simultaneously, the Army and other U.S. military services would gain valuable 
information that may prove useful in improving their own processes. This thesis seeks to 
serve both purposes. 
Examining the Army's assignment process involved researching the current 
system using numerous manuals and regulations covering Reassignment, Military 
Personnel Management, Enlisted Assignments and Utilization Management, and others. 
The assignment process is only a small, but essential element of the entire Army 
manpower system. Additionally, current participants in the process from the DCSPER 
and PERSCOM provided valuable insights. The Army assignment process and its 
relationship to the larger manpower system are presented in Chapter II. 
Further research for this thesis included analyzing the Army assignment process 
using labor market economics and job-matching theory, comparing the Army assignment 
process and the Navy detailing process, and simulating a two-sided matching process 
using a computer model. 
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B.        LABOR MARKET ECONOMICS 
Professors Gates and Nissen's paper, "Designing Agent-based Electronic 
Employment Markets," provided a valuable framework for analyzing the Army 
assignment process. Their paper describes problems with current employment 
approaches like those used in the U.S. military services and the fundamentals of labor 
markets including market-based labor markets, hierarchical labor markets and two-sided 
matching markets. Finally, it discusses intelligent agent technology and potential 
benefits of applying it to the challenge of matching workers and jobs, or soldiers and 
commands. The following paragraphs draw from the Gates and Nissen paper and present 
the theoretical framework for the analysis of the Army assignment process in Chapter V. 
1.        Hierarchical Planning and Distributed Markets 
There are two prevailing methods for matching people with jobs; (1) hierarchical 
planning and (2) distributed markets. Centrally planned economies (e.g. former Soviet- 
style) and command-and-control (e.g. military) organizations generally employ 
hierarchical planning techniques to match employees to jobs internal to the organization. 
Typically, U.S. military services use a centralized, hierarchical process to assign their 
members to jobs that leaves both service members and commands dissatisfied and results 
in poor morale, performance and retention. 
In contrast to hierarchical planning that matches employees to jobs internal to an 
organization, distributed markets match potential employees and external employers. 
Unlike in the military, distributed markets are found in labor markets where potential 
employees are able to move from one employer to another. In very large or complex 
distributed labor markets with vast amounts of information available about and to 
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employees and employers, information overload can be problematic and make it difficult 
to achieve stability in the system. 
Evolving information technology makes it possible to accomplish the job- 
matching process more effectively and efficiently. Intelligent agents offer excellent 
potential to help both potential employees and employers find one another in a 
distributed, electronic marketplace. To realize this potential requires that corresponding 
markets and technologies be designed together to mutually accomplish the desired results 
of effective and efficient matching, and conform to the necessary condition that the 
markets must clear. 
2.        Two-Sided Matching Markets 
In distributed markets, market wages make it possible to achieve the difficult task 
of balancing labor supply and demand. The market wage reflects complex interactions 
between supply and demand forces to achieve supply and demand efficiencies. However, 
in the military, wages are determined by fiat (e.g. by Congress) and respond very slowly 
to supply- and demand-driven pressures. Consequently, the Army (and the other U.S. 
military services) relies on a hierarchical planning process to assign their personnel, and 
administrative procedures replace wages as the market-clearing mechanism. Yet, the 
Army could benefit from the efficiencies that are associated with market-based systems, 
and achievable in two-sided matching markets. 
A two-sided matching market assigns individuals to jobs when there are several 
possible employers and employees. The matching algorithm balances the employers' and 
employees' preferences, but it can produce assignments that give priority to either 
employers or employees. As such, the algorithm specifically addresses both demand and 
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supply efficiency. Two-sided matching algorithms are currently used successfully in 
assigning medical students to residency programs (Roth and Sotomayor; Roth; and Roth 
and Peranson) and pledges to sororities at some colleges and universities (Mongell and 
Roth). (Gates and Nissen) 
3. Market Efficiency 
In the assignment process, efficiency refers to having appropriately trained 
soldiers assigned to jobs. There are two components of efficiency: supply and demand. 
Supply efficiency concerns soldiers who are supplying labor to the commands, 
and assigning them to jobs that best meet their desires. When soldiers are satisfied by 
their assignments, their morale, performance and retention tend to improve. Even the 
suggestion of compromising the needs of the Army to accommodate a soldier's desires 
causes discomfort among those who hold traditional views of military service. However, 
it can be shown that the benefits to the Army, measured in utility, outweigh the costs and 
do not necessarily sacrifice Army readiness. On the contrary, more satisfied soldiers are 
likely to be more productive and contribute to even higher readiness than under the 
current system. 
Demand efficiency involves commands that demand the labor, or soldiers. 
Demand efficiency implies that the commands receive properly trained soldiers when 
needed to satisfy readiness requirements and accomplish assigned missions, which 
ultimately meet national security strategy. Ideally, the Army assignment process would 
achieve supply and demand efficiency simultaneously. Efficiency ultimately relates to 
maintaining the Army's readiness requirements. When properly trained soldiers occupy 
the right jobs, the Army is able to operate efficiently. 
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4.        Market Effectiveness 
In the assignment process, effectiveness refers to timeliness. When soldiers 
occupy jobs at the right time, the process is operating effectively. Ineffective processes 
that result in delays and errors frustrate both sailors and commands. However, effective 
processes satisfy both, and satisfied soldiers are more likely to reenlist, thereby enhancing 
the Army's retention goals. 
Thus, the assignment process can directly and significantly affect balancing the 
Army's readiness through efficiency and the Army's retention goals through 
effectiveness. Pathologies in the enlisted assignment process are those conditions or 
areas that cause the process to be inefficient or ineffective. Identifying and eliminating 
the pathologies in the assignment process ensures it achieves its desired outcomes - 
achieving Army readiness and satisfying soldiers' desires. (Short) Chapter V will 
examine the possibility of using a two-sided matching process to achieve these outcomes. 
C.       COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
Navy Lieutenant Melissa Short recently completed her graduate thesis, "Analysis 
of the Current Navy Enlisted Detailing Process," under the guidance of Professor Gates 
and Commander Bill Hatch, an expert in the Navy's manpower processes and military 
manpower instructor at the Naval Postgraduate School. Comparing the Army's and 
Navy's processes revealed interesting and valuable insights about how military personnel 
might be assigned more efficiently and effectively than current processes allow. The 
results of this comparison are presented in Chapter V. 
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D.       PROCESS SIMULATION 
Finally, a computer simulation of the assignment process provided empirical data 
suggesting the potential benefits of using a two-sided matching model to improve the 
assignment process.    In their graduate thesis, "Agent-Based Simulation System: A 
Demonstration of the Advantages of an Electronic Employment Market in a Large 
Military Organization," Majors Hock Sing Ng and Cheow Guan Soh of the Singapore 
Armed Forces, designed a computer model to simulate two-sided matching of sailors and 
commands.     The  Agent-Based Employment Market  Simulator (ABEMS)  model 
calculates the total and average utility of sailors and commands as a measure of their 
satisfaction with the process outputs.    If further allows the user to specify either 
command- or sailor-bias, which impacts the resulting utility of sailors and commands. 
The model provides a useful tool for estimating the potential benefits of a two-sided 
matching process for a randomly generated set of sailors and commands with simulated 
preferences and priorities.   It was also possible to manually calculate the utility of the 
same sailors and commands in one-sided matching scenarios, which provided a useful 
basis for evaluating the value of both systems. 
E.        CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The methodology used to prepare this thesis provided the background, theoretical 
framework and tools necessary for analyzing the Army assignment process. They will be 
used in the following chapter to examine components of the Army system that contribute 
positively to its efficiency and effectiveness, and those that do not. 
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V.      ANALYSIS OF FINDINGS 
A.       OVERVIEW 
The Army operates a centralized, hierarchical assignment process in support of 
Army manpower management objectives.    The Enlisted Distribution Target Model 
(EDTM) is designed to achieve this goal, but it falls short in several respects.    It 
effectively assigns soldiers to jobs at the right time to meet the Army's needs; soldiers 
receive timely orders and report for their new assignment when the Army needs them. 
However, it often fails to efficiently match soldiers and commands according to their 
preferences, and this chapter discusses why the process fails. It then compares the Army 
assignment process to the Navy detailing process to learn about best practices used by 
both services, and demonstrates the potential benefit of using a two-sided matching 
process to assign soldiers and sailors.   Making the process more efficient offers the 
prospects of enhancing both soldier and command satisfaction with the process, thereby 
improving their  satisfaction  and  subsequent performance,  which directly  ensures 
command mission accomplishment and future Army readiness. 
B.       ONE-SIDED MATCHING PROCESS 
The Army uses the one-sided matching process in the Enlisted Distribution 
Assignment System (EDAS), discussed in Chapter II.   The desired assignment process 
output balances two sometimes-conflicting goals: assigning the right soldier to the right 
billet at the right time, and simultaneously satisfying soldier and command preferences. 
This output leads to the desired outcome of satisfied soldiers and commands, high levels 
of readiness and morale, and an Army capable of accomplishing its missions in support 
of national security strategy.   Chapter IV discussed the principles of market efficiency 
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and effectiveness.   Because wages are determined by fiat, the Army's internal labor 
market lacks a market-clearing mechanism that is propelled by market forces.    If 
permitted to respond to labor market forces of labor supply and demand, wage rates tend 
toward equilibrium and balance labor supply and demand.   Higher wage rates result in 
less demand for labor because it is relatively more expensive than other inputs, and 
higher wage rates increase the supply of labor because more workers are willing to work 
for a higher wage.   Wages capture the vast amount of information that workers use to 
determine which jobs they prefer and are willing to accept, and employers use to 
determine the quantity and quality of labor they will demand. Eventually, market wages 
adjust and ensure equity between labor supply and demand.   Because military wages are 
not subject to normal market forces, the Army uses a centralized, hierarchical process to 
balance labor supply and demand and mimic the results of market-based labor markets. 
At the core of the problem resulting in process inefficiencies is the one-sided 
matching process in EDAS that is heavily biased in favor of commands, at the expense of 
soldiers.   EDAS is well suited to achieving effectiveness goals and ensuring soldiers 
occupy billets at the right time, subject to manpower constraints and prioritization of 
certain billets.   Although frustrated by chronically having fewer soldiers available than 
authorized, commands are satisfied overall.  And, soldiers normally receive assignment 
instructions in advance of their required move, allowing them to plan accordingly. 
Frustration and dissatisfaction arises for soldiers, however, when they regularly receive 
assignments that fall short of meeting their expectations. Commands have little incentive 
to support changing the system that is already biased in their favor. Perhaps commands 
would enthusiastically lend their support if the new system offered soldiers who are more 
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satisfied with their assignment and are likely to perform better, without risk of reducing 
the systems effectiveness. 
Soldiers understand the preeminence of the Army's mission accomplishment and 
therefore can accept assignments different than those desired or expected. However, 
soldiers want to be treated as a valuable commodity, and not just a body filling a billet or 
a name removing a requisition from EDAS. (Short) When matched efficiently with 
assignments they prefer, soldiers' expectations are met about operations tempo and 
quality of life issues affecting the soldiers and their families. Soldiers are then more 
satisfied with the frequency of deployments, resources available for training, quality of 
leadership and perceived opportunities for personal and professional development. A 
soldier's pay does not change from one assignment to another, except for airborne and 
other special assignments. Simply meeting a soldier's expectations increases his or her 
satisfaction, increasing individual and organizational performance, which directly 
enhance unit readiness. 
C.       TWO-SIDED MATCHING PROCESS 
Soldiers have much to gain from improving the efficiency of the assignment 
process. A two-sided matching process would give greater emphasis to soldier 
preferences, improving their satisfaction with assignments. A two-sided matching 
process determines assignments according to rank order preferences for soldiers over 
commands and commands over soldiers. The soldier-biased approach begins by 
tentatively assigning each soldier to his or her preferred command. When there are 
conflicts (multiple soldiers to the same command), the commands' rank-ordered 
preferences are used to break ties (the soldier the command ranks highest, among those 
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tentatively assigned, remains tentatively assigned).   Any unassigned soldiers are then 
tentatively assigned to their next choice, again with command preferences breaking ties. 
This process continues until all soldiers are either assigned to a command or are 
unassigned but have exhausted their preference list, and there are no conflicts.   This 
outcome is stable and has the highest utility for the soldiers.  Stability implies that both 
the soldier and command consider the centrally determined match to be at least as 
desirable as matches that could be arranged outside the two-sided matching process.  A 
match is unstable if a soldier and command both prefer one another to the respective 
command and soldier with which they are centrally matched; the soldier and command 
would both prefer to form their own agreement (e.g. the commander might call the 
assignment manager to request the soldier).    Stable equilibrium can emphasize the 
soldier's preferences, the command's preferences, or potentially provide an intermediate 
solution. (Gates) 
D.       INTELLIGENT AGENTS 
The Office of Naval Research (ONR), also called Naval Personnel Research, 
Science and Technology (NPRST), is sponsoring research at the Naval Postgraduate 
School (NPS) and elsewhere to redesign the Navy's enlisted distribution management 
system. The NPS research effort, of which this thesis is a part, involves two research 
thrusts: designing a Web-based virtual marketplace to replace the existing labor-intensive 
assignment process, and developing an assignment algorithm (e.g. two-sided) to match 
enlisted personnel with commands. (Gates and Nissen) The virtual Web-based 
marketplace, referred to as the Personnel Mall, will exploit existing intelligent mall 
concepts, in which intelligent software agents serve as information brokers between 
buyers (e.g. commands) and sellers (e.g. soldiers).    Software agents representing the 
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soldiers will interact with software agents representing the commands, through broker 
agents, to determine the job assignments that match the soldiers' preferences and the 
Army's needs as closely as possible. 
The following section presents evidence that the overall satisfaction of soldiers 
and commands increases when using a two-sided matching process that could be 
employed in a Web-based Personnel Mall. 
E.        SIMULATION RESULTS 
The Agent-Based Employment Market Simulator (ABEMS) provides a useful 
tool for estimating the benefit of using a two-sided matching process to assign soldiers 
instead of a one-sided process. 
ABEMS calculates the total and average utility of soldiers and commands as a 
measure of their satisfaction with the process outputs. ABEMS allows the user to specify 
either a command- or soldier-bias, which impacts the resulting utility of the soldiers and 
commands. Table 5.1 shows the results of two iterations of a two-sided matching 
process. The first iteration had a command bias. The second iteration had a soldier bias. 
Also illustrated are the utilities of the same soldiers and commands matched by the two- 
sided process, manually calculated for comparison using a one-sided matching process 
similar to the one used by ED AS. Their combined utility is also presented for each 
scenario. Normally, it is not possible to add the utility scores of different groups. 
However, because the utility functions for commands and sailors were derived for this 
simulation to represent the value of the match to each party, it is possible to add their 
utility scores here. 
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Table 5.1. ABEMS Computer Simulation Results 
The two-sided matching process in ABEMS simulates the difficult challenge of 
assigning over 100,000 soldiers annually in the Army. For the simulations conducted for 
this thesis, ABEMS randomly generated 30 soldiers, each with unique preferences and 
corresponding utility functions, and 45 commands with their own unique preferences and 
utility functions. The disparity between the number of soldiers and commands is 
intended to simulate chronically having fewer soldiers available than authorized billets. 
Utility scores range from one to five, with a score of five for a perfect soldier-command 
match. ABEMS automatically conducts the two-sided matching process and calculates 
the resulting utility for soldiers and commands. Using the same soldiers and commands 
from the two-sided matching processes, it was possible to manually calculate the 
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expected outcome of a one-sided match like the one used in EDAS.   The results are 
interesting and support the hypothesis that the two-sided process is superior. 
As suggested previously, commands obtain the highest utility in a command- 
biased one-sided match process, with a score of 3.95 in this simulation. In the same 
simulation, soldiers experience the lowest utility with a score of 2.72. Their combined 
utility is the lowest of all four scenarios, with a score of 6.67. It is predictable that in a 
one-sided match, the utility outcome will always favor whoever benefits from the bias. 
In a two-sided match, again the bias affects the resulting utility of soldiers and 
commands. In the simulated two-sided match with command bias, commands obtain an 
average utility of 3.66, and soldiers obtain a utility of 3.30. Their combined utility is 
6.96. This suggests that if the Army transitioned to a two-sided matching process for 
assigning soldiers and retained the current command bias, command utility would 
continue to exceed soldier utility, but it would decrease and, hence, commands would 
derive less satisfaction from the system. However, soldiers would experience significant 
increases in average utility, and the combined utility of soldiers and commands would 
increase. Although the commands would sacrifice some utility, the Army would benefit 
as a whole. 
The   soldier-biased  two-sided  matching  results   are   even  more  intriguing. 
Commands and soldiers obtain approximately equal utility, 3.54 and 3.53, respectively, 
and their combined utility of 7.06 is higher than the two-sided match with a command 
bias.   This result suggests that the soldier-biased two-sided match might be the most 
effective and efficient way to balance Army requirements and readiness with soldiers' 
professional development needs and personal preferences. 
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The results of these simulations do not carry the weight of statistically valid 
research, and are not intended to do so. They are only intended to suggest that, in fact, 
there exists an opportunity to improve the current Army assignment system to benefit 
soldiers, commands and other stakeholders responsible for ensuring Army readiness in 
support of the national security strategy. 
F.        COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS: BEST PRACTICES 
Recently, Navy Lieutenant Melissa Short completed her graduate thesis, 
"Analysis of the Current Navy Enlisted Detailing Process," in support of the research 
being conducted by Professors Gates and Nissen at the Naval Postgraduate School. 
Objectives of their research include examining the assignment processes of all the U.S. 
military services, identifying the best practices of each, discovering the most effective 
and efficient methods to achieve the services' assignment objectives. This section 
compares the best practices of the Army assignment process and the Navy detailing 
process. 
Predictably, the two systems are similar. They are both centrally planned 
hierarchical systems designed to serve large military organizations, and both leave many 
parties (e.g. soldiers, sailors and commands) dissatisfied, which results in poor morale, 
performance and retention. Also, their stakeholders are similar, including their service 
chiefs and other policy-makers, personnel commands that operate the systems, and 
commands, sailors and soldiers who are matched in the processes. The Army and Navy 
determine requirements and allocate their manpower resources to commands similarly, 
according to their established priority. The Army and Navy diverge, however, in two 
critical areas: (1) obtaining and attempting to satisfy individual preferences, and (2) 
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automating the matching process. Neither service performs either of these areas 
perfectly; both could benefit by learning from the other's practice. The following 
sections describe these two areas, and how they differ between the services. 
1.        Individual Preferences 
The Navy commits far more resources than the Army trying to satisfy enlisted 
sailors' individual preferences. In addition to detailers, who are the equivalent of Army 
assignment managers and responsible for matching sailors to requisitions, the Navy uses 
Command Career Counselors (CCC) and the Job Advertising and Selection System 
(JASS). JASS is an online information and decision support system for sailors, 
Command Career Counselors and detailers. Command Career Counselors are assigned to 
commands and assist sailors in selecting available jobs that are best suited to their 
personal and professional interests. At their convenience, sailors around the world view 
posted prioritized billets, and apply for them through their CCC. Prior to JASS, sailors 
had to negotiate with detailers via the telephone. Before the Navy introduced JASS in 
1995, there was no similar tool for optimizing the Navy's priorities and sailors' desires. 
JASS permits sailors to view jobs available in their pay grade and rating (grade 
and MOS in the Army) or Navy Enlisted Code (NEC). View-only JASS allows sailors to 
see, but not apply for, all available jobs in the current requisition cycle. This initiative 
allows sailors to go on-line in the comfort of their homes or work spaces to explore 
available jobs. Sailors can see available positions, research alternatives, and discuss 
options with their family. Ultimately, this information system allows sailors to make 
informed, sagacious decisions regarding their next duty assignment. 
41 
Only Command Career Counselors, or those designated by their Commanding 
Officer as career counselors, have the required access to make job applications. 
Command Career Counselors are involved for two reasons. First, they ensure that the 
sailors are eligible and qualified for the positions to which they are applying. Second, 
Command Career Counselors are fully engaged in the advisory role for sailors' careers. 
View-only JASS offers sailors flexibility and convenience. 
Most important, JASS offers sailors an interactive way to provide direct input into 
their assignments.  JASS is more robust than the Army's current system, which allows 
soldiers only to indicate a preference for geographic regions and major Army posts. 
Soldiers learn their specific job assignment from their Command Sergeant Major only 
after they arrive at their new duty stations.   In some cases, senior noncommissioned 
officers learn of their positions in advance through personal contacts or their assigned 
sponsor, but there is no formal system for informing them prior to arrival. Only now is 
the Army developing a tool, similar to JASS, which will enable soldiers to participate 
more actively in the assignment process.   It may not be practicable, however, for the 
Army to make information about specific jobs available to soldiers.    This type of 
centralization is not necessary for assigning enlisted soldiers in the Army's system. 
Instead that function is best performed locally by Command Sergeants Major who are 
responsible for managing and developing enlisted soldiers. 
2.        System Automation 
While JASS is an impressive tool for communicating with sailors and enabling 
them to participate in the assignment process, there are several weaknesses. First, sailors 
apply for up to five assignments and they expect to receive their first choice; they are 
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frequently disappointed when they do not The most significant weakness results because 
JASS is not compatible with the Navy's Enlisted Personnel Requisition System (EPRES) 
or the Enlisted Assignment Information System (EAIS). EPRES and EAIS serve 
functions similar to those of the Army's EDAS. EPRES generates requisitions when a 
command's projected manning in a particular rating (MOS) and rate (pay grade) falls 
below projected Navy Manning Plan (NMP) levels. Requisitions are then downloaded 
into EAIS where they appear according to priority, and detailers review them. Unlike 
EDAS, however, EAIS does not automatically nominate sailors to fill requisitions. 
Instead, detailers must manually select sailors to fill each requisition. 
Figure 5.1 illustrates that detailers must account for many factors when matching 
sailors to requisitions, without assistance from a system similar to EDAS. Currently, the 
Navy has no single tool to help detailers "mentally juggle" diverse policies, procedures 
and information to ensure that the right sailor with the necessary skills is assigned to the 
rightjobontime. 
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Figure 5.1. Navy Detailer Considerations. 
From: Navy Personnel Research, Studies and Technologies, March 2000 
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Detailers continually struggle to manage the Navy's requirements and the sailor's 
wishes, and perhaps a system that automates the matching process would be valuable to 
Navy detailers and improve the efficiency of the Navy assignment system. It is important 
to remember that EDAS uses a one-sided matching process, the results of which could be 
improved by using a two-sided process. However, EDAS does eliminate much of the 
labor-intensive work for Army assignment managers that Navy detailers must perform. 
G.       CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter has demonstrated the limitations of using a one-sided matching 
process in the Army's assignment process.   It leads to inefficient outputs that fail to 
satisfy soldiers' desires, decreasing morale, performance and retention, and possibly 
compromising Army readiness.   Using a two-sided matching process more efficiently 
mimics market forces normally captured in wages and increases overall satisfaction with 
the assignment process.  Both the Army and Navy, and perhaps the other U.S. military 
services, would benefit from using a two-sided matching process to assign enlisted 
personnel.   Additionally, the services could benefit by learning from each other's best 
practices. Although imperfect in their current form, the Navy aggressively tries to learn 
and satisfy sailors' assignment preferences using JASS, and the Army uses an automated 
matching process to eliminate many manual procedures using EDAS.   Integrating the 
interactive capabilities of JASS with a two-sided process in EDAS would enable the 
services to effectively and efficiently balance their readiness needs with individual 
preferences, and satisfy their stakeholders better than the current system allows. 
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VI.    CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A.       RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 
1. Primary Research Question 
What is the overall efficiency and effectiveness of the Army's current assignment 
process? The Army's assignment process effectively accomplishes its most basic 
mission: it assigns soldiers to billets. However, using a one-sided matching process may 
not be the most efficient method. This thesis shows how implementing a two-sided 
matching process will offer the opportunity to make the system more efficient, and better 
satisfy its stakeholders. 
2. Subsidiary Research Questions 
Who are the stakeholders in the assignment process, and what are their concerns? 
The eight stakeholders are: (1) the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and 
Reserve Affairs (ASA (M&RA)); (2) the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER); 
(3) the U.S. Total Army Personnel Command (PERSCOM); (4) PERSCOM Assignment 
Managers; (5) Local Military Personnel Divisions (MPDs) and Personnel Service 
Battalions (PSBs) and Companies (PSCs); (6) Major Army Commands (MACOMs); (7) 
Field Commanders (e.g. Divisions, Brigades, Battalions, etc.); and (8) soldiers. Their 
collective primary concern is ensuring Army readiness by placing the right soldier in the 
right job at the right time. This contrasts slightly with the Navy's concept of the R4 
Sailor: the right sailor with the right skills in the right job at the right time. The Navy 
specifies the need for sailors to have the right skills, which the Army implies when 
describing the right soldier. Commands are particularly concerned with the system 
output, and receiving sufficient quality and quantities of soldiers to accomplish their 
45 
mission in support of the national security strategy. Soldiers are particularly concerned 
with the system satisfying their personal and professional needs while serving the needs 
of the Army. 
What positive aspects of the Army's assignment process should be preserved? 
The single most positive aspect of the Army's assignment process is its use of the 
Enlisted Distribution Assignment System (EDAS), an automated matching process. 
Despite its inability to achieve the same efficiency as a two-sided matching process it 
contributes positively to the Army's ability to meet its manpower and manning objectives. 
What pathologies, or deviations from an efficient process exist, and what are their 
effects on retention? The Army assignment system inadequately accounts and attempts 
to satisfy individual soldiers' personal and professional desires. Soldiers today face many 
opportunities outside the Army, and in order to retain them, the Army must do more to 
satisfy their preferences and become an employer of choice. The Army now finds itself 
engaged in a "war for talent" in an economy boasting unprecedented levels of prosperity, 
and the Army must improve to compete favorably in the future. 
What comparisons can be made between the Army and Navy assignment 
processes?   The Army and Navy assignment processes are similar, and share similar 
objectives.     However,  important differences  exist between how they incorporate 
individual preferences into the assignment process, and how they automate it. The Army 
will do well when it brings online its system similar to the Navy's JASS, and the Navy 
would benefit from incorporating the benefits of JASS into an automated matching 
process similar to the Army's EDAS.  Both, however, would improve the efficiency of 
their assignment process by developing and using a two-sided matching model. 
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B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
There is a need for a more efficient and effective assignment process in the Army. 
The Army must immediately respond to how it gathers and uses soldier assignment 
preferences. Increased satisfaction with the assignment process directly leads to 
improved morale, performance and retention. Using a two-sided matching model will 
enable the Army to more effectively balance its requirements and readiness with soldiers' 
professional needs and personal preferences. Specifically, to improve the assignment 
process, the Army should: 
• Implement an online, interactive tool enabling soldiers to submit assignment 
preferences. 
• Incorporate   a   two-sided   matching   model   into   Enlisted   Distribution 
Assignment System (EDAS) to improve process efficiency. 
C. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Should the military pay system be changed and allow wages to act as a market- 
clearing mechanism for the military labor market? Would it be feasible? 
Is it cost effective to implement an online, interactive tool enabling soldiers to 
submit assignment preferences? 
What is the overall efficiency and effectiveness of the Army's current assignment 
process for officers? 
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APPENDIXES 
APPENDIX A: ACRONYMS 
ABEMS - Agent-Based Employment Market Simulator 
AI - Assignment Instructions 
AIT - Advanced Individual Training 
ASA (M&RA) - Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs 
BT - Basic Training 
CCC - Command Career Counselors 
CONUS - Continental United States 
DA - Department of the Army 
DCSPER - Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel 
DMDC - Defense Manpower Data Center 
EAIS - Enlisted Assignment Information System 
ED AS - Enlisted Distribution Assignment System 
EDTM - Enlisted Distribution Target Model 
EPRES - Enlisted Personnel Requisition System 
ETS - Expiration Term of Service 
HQDA - Headquarters, Department of the Army 
JASS - Job Advertising and Selection System 
MACOM - Major Army Command 
MILPER - Military Personnel System 
MILPO - Military Personnel Office 
MPD - Military Personnel Division 
MOS - Military Occupational Specialty 
MOSLS - MOS Level System 
MTOE - Modified Table of Organization and Equipment 
NEC - Navy Enlisted Code 
NMP - Navy Manning Plan 
NPRST - Naval Personnel Research, Science and Technology 
NPS -Naval Postgraduate School 
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ONR - Office of Naval Research 
PAC - Personnel Action Center 
PBG - Program Budget Guidance 
PCS - Permanent Change of Station 
PERSCOM - U.S. Total Army Personnel Command 
PMAD - Personnel Manning Authorization Document 
PPBS - Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (DoD) 
PPBES - Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution System (Army) 
PRD - Projected Rotation Date 
PSC - Personnel Service Company 
R4 - Right sailor, with the Right skills, in the Right job, at the Right time 
Req - Requisition 
SQI - Skill Qualification Identifier 
TAA - Total Army Analysis 
TDA - Table of Distribution and Allowances 
TIS - Time in Service 
UIC - Unit Identification Code 
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APPENDIX B: RESULTS OF TWO-SIDED COMMAND-BIASED MATCHING 
PROCESS 
Results of Two-Sided Command-Biased Matching Process 
Match Command soldier 
command soldier Preference utility preference Utility 
1 / 1 Aim 4 3.8291 
2 23 10 1.5589 3 3.2261 
3 14 3 3.8718 6 3.Ö079 
4 21 1 3.Ö819 1 3.1907 
5 17 7 1.9599 1 4.4905 
6 29 1 3.926Ö 2 1.8056 
7 27 3 4.7382 3 3.0298 
8 No Match 
9 25 2 4.1899 1 5.ÖÖÖÖ 
10 1 6 3.1883 2 3.9347 
11 No Match 
12 No Match 
13 No Match 
14 No Match 
15 22 5 3.1645 4 2.9168 
16 No Match 
17 2 1 3.8073 6 2.5552 
18 No Match 
19 5 1 4.5263 1 3.0977 
20 No Match 
21 No Match 
22 28 4 3.1842 3 1.0402 
23 19 2 3.9839 4 3.6281 
24 9 1 5.Ö00Ö 1 4.9ÖÖ4 
25 30 1 4.7302 2 3.7466 
26 No Match 
27 6 4 3.9697 1 2.8738 
28 No Match 
29 3 1 2.4267 1 4.9784 
30 15 1 4.1423 1 4.3600 
31 13 3 4.2532 2 1.3710 
32 No Match 
33 18 2 4.5452 6 1.6825 
34 24 9 2.9997 2 3.9840 
35 11 1 3.7334 2 3.0673 
36 No Match 
3/ 10 1 5.0000 1 3.3459 
38 20 5 2.5656 4 3.2803 
39 26 3 4.9473 3 3.92Ö5 







Note: Because of small sample sizes (30 soldiers and 40 commands) 
not all commands are matched to a soldier. 
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APPENDIX C: RESULTS OF TWO-SIDED SOLDIER-BIASED MATCHING 
PROCESS 
Results of Two-Sided Soldier-Biased Matching Process 
Match SOIC ler Command 
soldier command Preference Utility Preference Utility 
i 10 2 HM4/ b 14.1083" 
2 17 6 2.5552 1 3.8Ö73 
3 29 1 4.9784 1 2.4267 
4 No Match 
5 19 1 3.Ö977 1 4.5263 
6 27 1 2.8738 4 3.9697 
7 1 4 3.8291 1 4.2786 
8 No Match 
9 24 1 4.9004 1 5.ÖÖÖÖ 
10 37 1 3.3459 1 5.ÖÖÖÖ 
11 35 2 3.0673 1 3.7334 
12 No Match 
13 6 1 4.6021 6 2.5619 
14 3 6 3.0079 3 3.8718 
15 30 1 4.36ÖÖ 1 4.1423 
16 40 5 2.7022 10 1.0062 
17 5 1 4.49Ö5 7 1.9599 
18 33 6 16825 2 4.5452 
19 23 4 3.6281 2 3.9839 
20 38 4 3.2803 5 2.5656 
21 4 1 3.1907 1 3.0818 
22 15 4 2.9168 5 3.1645 
23 2 3 3.2261 10 1.5589 
24 34 2 3.9840 9 2.9997 
25 9 1 5.ÖÖÖÖ 2 4.1899 
26 39 3 3.92Ö5 3 4.9473 
27 7 3 3.0298 3 4.7382 
28 22 3 1.Ö402 4 3.1842 
29 31 1 4.8365 4 2.3140 
30 2b 2 37466 1 4.7302 
lotal yi.2273 §5.4759 
Average 3.5269 3.5361 
Note: Because of small sample sizes (30 soldiers and 40 commands) 
not all soldiers are matched to a command. 
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APPENDIX D: RESULTS OF ONE-SIDED COMMAND-BIASED MATCHING 
PROCESS 
Results of One-Sided Command-Biased Matching Process 
Match command soldier 
command soldier Preference Utility Preference Utility 
1 t 1 4.2 786 4 3.B2Ö1 
2 16 3 3.2134 No Pref 
3 22 1 4.0293 6 2.3358 
4 No Match 
5 1 6 1.9599 8 1.4239 
6 29 1 3.926Ö 2 1.8056 
7 5 1 4.7382 7 1.4113 
8 No Match 
9 24 1 4.1899 3 4.1899 
10 25 2 3.8253 3 3.9234 
11 No Match 
12 No Match 
13 No Match 
14 No Match 
15 No Match 
16 No Match 
17 14 2 3.8073 No Pref 
18 No Match 
19 6 2 4.5263 10 1.2393 
20 23 1 3.3Q67 10 2.2334 
21 19 2 3.0515 No Pref 
22 No Match 
23 3 1 3.9839 2 4.9507 
24 9 1 5.0000 1 4.9Ö04 
25 30 1 4.7302 2 3.7466 
26 21 1 3.6193 4 1.9468 
27 2 2 3.9881 9 1.6715 
28 No Match 
29 No Match 
30 No Match 
31 13 3 4.2532 2 1.3710 
32 27 3 4.0337 No Pref 
33 18 2 4.5452 6 1.6825 
34 11 1 3.9997 No Pref 
35 20 2 3.7334 2 4.4918 
36 ' 26 3 4.3672 No Pref 
37 10 1 5.0000 1 3.3459 
38 17 9 16072 8 1.1766 
39 15 1 4.9473 No Pref 
4U No Match 
lotal luzeeoa 51.6755 
Average 3.9485 2.7198 
Note: Because of small sample sizes (30 soldiers and 40 commands) 
not all commands are matched to a soldier. 
55 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
56 
APPENDIX E:  RESULTS  OF  ONE-SIDED SOLDIER-BIASED MATCHING 
PROCESS 
Results of One-Sided Soldier-Biased Matching Process 
Match Soldier command 
soldier command preference Utility Preference Utility 
1 9 i 0.0000 3 4.0H41 
2 1 1 4.1686 2 4.0929 
3 29 1 4.9784 1 2.4267 
4 No Match 
5 19 1 3.0977 4 2.9Ö94 
6 11 5 1.6656 9 3.2742 
7 30 1 4.7528 5 3.7747 
8 No Match 
9 24 1 4.9004 1 5.0000 
10 8 3 2.4464 1 3.9306 
11 2 8 2.0981 1 3.4685 
12 No Match 
13 6 1 4.6021 4 2.5619 
14 3 6 3.0079 3 3.8718 
15 33 2 3.7956 1 4.5452 
16 40 5 2.7022 10 1.0062 
17 5 1 4.4905 7 1.9599 
18 19 8 1.51Ö3 9 3.6837 
19 23 4 3.6281 2 3.9839 
20 38 4 3.28Ö3 5 2.5656 
21 4 1 3.1907 1 3.Ö819 
22 30 2 3.4653 4 3.9481 
23 35 1 5.0000 10 2.0926 
24 34 2 3.984Ö 9 2.9997 
25 10 3 3.9234 2 3.8253 
26 7 1 4.6249 10 3.7992 
27 15 4 3.0298 3 4.1482 
28 27 1 4.7852 7 3.9697 
29 31 1 4.8365 4 2.3140 
30                 37 1 4.0411 3 3.9930 
lotal iin.uusa 91.311Ü 
Average 3.7410 3.3819 
Note: Because of small sample sizes (30 soldiers and 40 commands) 
not all soldiers are matched to a command. 
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